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Abstract
This paper aims at extending some recent publications about the relationship between an-
tidumping filings and macroeconomic factors by comparing the United States (US) and the Euro-
pean Union (EU), two major users of antidumping procedures. Results of our estimations confirm
that the exchange rate exerts a similar influence in the two countries. Fluctuations in the real
GDP influence antidumping filings only in the US. On the contrary, the evolution of industrial
production does not play an important role in the US, while its impact is important in Europe. The
reinforcement of international competition appears to significantly increase antidumping filings in
the US while this relationship turns out not to be significant in Europe. Finally, some of the most
important differences between the US and the EU seem to be explainable by the differences of
rules and practices implemented by the regulatory authorities.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite a voluminous literature over the past 20 years on the economic causes 
and consequences of antidumping policies, both in the U.S. and in other 
countries, little work has been done on the extent to which patterns of 
antidumping filings have been driven by macroeconomic phenomena. 
Basically, three major contributions have been proposed so far: two papers 
written by R. Feinberg (1989, 2005) and a paper written by Prusa and Knetter 
(2003). To some extent, the antidumping action looks like “an invitation to a 
dance”1. Indeed, the antidumping procedure is undoubtedly a request for a 
foreign firm to adjust their price, which would put an end to the case, instead 
of applying punitive duties. However, the “dance tune” is far from peaceful 
and harmonious and the request turns out to be rather an injunction or a threat.  
Basically, the antidumping procedure is composed of three stages: 
initiation, investigation and decision. In order to be admissible, a complaint 
must meet three conditions: (1) Petitioners must be supported by a significant 
part of the import-competing industry; (2) Petitioners must provide certain 
information related to the alleged dumping practice, namely the reduction of 
the import price and the increase in import quantities; (3) The similarity of the 
good produced by the plaintiffs to the import good. Only those companies 
which produce a good considered to be sufficiently similar to the alleged 
dumped import product, are entitled to lodge a complaint. When the 
preliminary determination of dumping has been made, antidumping measures 
may be taken. When the final findings have been made and consequent injury 
to the domestic industry proved, the final antidumping duty may be imposed. 
This article is focused exclusively on the first stage. More precisely, 
our objective is to analyze the influence that macroeconomic factors may exert 
an on the number of initiations. Clearly, our ambition is not to explain 
antidumping filings. Sectorial or microeconomic factors play obviously a more 
determining role than macroeconomic factors. Our objective is more specific 
and limited. Our goal is to analyze if and how macroeconomic factors in 
general, namely fluctuations in economic growth and real exchange rates or 
the evolution of import penetration rate affect the opening of new antidumping 
actions. To this end, we compare the two most important world filers, the 
United States and European Union during the period 1990-2002. Interest in 
this comparison stems from the fact that the antidumping procedure combines 
an international regulation (the WTO antidumping code instituted by article 6 
of the GATT and specified by the Tokyo antidumping code and its 1994 
revision) and national rules. We suspect that differences in national rules and 
practices may condition the influence of macroeconomic factors. This 
investigation draws upon and seeks to provide an extension to these previous 
publications. In a pioneering study, R. Feinberg (1989) investigated the causes 
                                                 
1 We are grateful for the anonymous referee who suggested us this comparison. 
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of antidumping filings in the US between 1982 and 1987, using a Tobit model. 
He focused his research on the four countries which are mostly targeted by the 
US antidumping authorities: Japan, Brazil, Mexico and South Korea. Feinberg 
established that fluctuations in the real exchange rate are a significant factor in 
the opening of inquiries, especially for Japan. More precisely, he showed that 
the increase in antidumping procedures between 1982 and 1987 was 
significantly related to the weakness of the US dollar. In addition, Feinberg 
found evidence of a negative impact of growth in GDP on the number of 
filings. However, the discreet nature of the values taken by the number of 
openings of inquiries induces us to question the appropriateness of the Tobit 
method. More recently, Feinberg (2005) used a negative binomial model in 
order to estimate the determinants of quarterly antidumping petitions in the US 
between 1981 and 1998. His conclusion was quite different: over this last 
period, US antidumping filings rose with the appreciation (not the 
depreciation) of the US dollar. This divergence about the consequences of 
exchange rate changes is not really surprising in far as the influence of 
exchange rates on filling behaviour is ambivalent, as underlined by an 
abundant literature about the exchange rate pass through2. Knetter and Prusa 
(2003) used the same technique (negative binomial model) for four of the most 
important antidumping users: Australia, Canada, the EU and the US. In 
Knetter and Prusa, the dependant variable is the number of filings occurring 
every year between 1980 and 1998. Surprisingly, neither Feinberg nor Knetter 
and Prusa take into account the possible influence of the import penetration 
rate. In our opinion, this macroeconomic variable must be considered for at 
least three reasons: 
 
- First, an increase in the rate of import penetration means (or can be 
perceived to mean) more rigorous foreign competition. 
- Second, the proof of material injury requires evidence that the industry 
has experienced a sharp increase in imports. 
- Third, the new WTO antidumping code reinforces the obligation for 
the reporting country to establish a causal relationship between the 
dumped imports and the damage suffered by the complainant industry. 
 
Furthermore, earlier studies neglected the impact of the designated 
period used to evaluate the damage. 
The article is organized as follows. The second section describes the 
data, the variables and their relations. A brief presentation of the model used is 
also discussed. The third section presents and interprets our results. A final 
section summarizes our main conclusions.  
                                                 
2 The pass through describes how firms adjust the price (denoted in the importing country 
currency) of the goods they export to a change in the exchange rate. The percentage by which 
the prices of the exports rise when the currency of the exporting is appreciating is known as 
the degree of pass through from the exchange rate to the price. If it is equal to 1, the pass 
through is complete. If it is less than 1, the pass through is partial or incomplete. 
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DATA, MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES AND RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Our objective is to test the following hypotheses, for both in the US and in the 
EU: 
 
H1: We test the existence of a relation between the number of AD fillings and 
the real exchange rate fluctuations. More precisely is the number of AD 
initiations increasing with the real appreciation of the reporting country’s 
currency?3. 
 
H2.The number of inquiries opened decreases with an increase in the rate of 
growth of the import country’s real GDP. The sensitivity of the business 
community to perceived foreign unfair pricing behaviour is increased in an 
economic slump, as is the incentive of foreign firms to cut prices in order to 
maintain export volumes. At the same time, it becomes easier for the 
importing country to prove an injury during a slump or downturn in the 
economy. 
 
H3. The number of antidumping actions rises with an increase in the rate of 
import penetration in the filing country. 
 
DATA 
 
Data on initiations of antidumping actions between 1990 and 2002 
come from the WTO antidumping database. The data are available, because 
WTO members are under a continuing obligation to report their antidumping 
actions to the WTO Secretariat (article 6). 
Tables 1 and 2 display the number of filings over the period 1990-
2002. The figures show that the US initiated twice as many inquiries as the 
EU. If we consider the patterns of bilateral filings (of each initiating country 
against particular countries), the US is the most active filer, with 292 actions 
among which 118 targeted the EU. Conversely, the EU aimed few of its 
initiations at the US (11 cases out of 133). The EU mostly targeted Asian 
countries and especially China, which is the most affected country, both by the 
EU and by the US4. The maximum number of filings in any quarter is equal to 
5 for the EU, while it is equal to 22 for the US.  
 
                                                 
3 The literature on ‘monetary protectionism’ notes that a country may devalue its domestic 
currency in order to boost its exports and improve, albeit disloyally, its competitiveness in the 
trading partners’ markets. However, such ‘monetary dumping’ is not subject to the WTO 
antidumping code. 
4 Even though the United States is the most important filing country, it is also one of the most 
targeted countries, followed by China, Japan and Korea. These 4 countries were cited in 30% 
of the antidumping procedures initiated between 1980 and 1998. 
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Table 1: US Antidumping petitions between 1990 and 2002 against selected target countries 
(Number of cases filed per quarter) 
 Target countries 
 European  
Union  
Korea Canada China Japan Five target 
countries 
Average 2.27 0.63 0.42 1.42 0.86 1.12 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 22 4 4 4 3 22 
Standard 
deviation 
3.62 0.97 0.87 1.30 0.79 1.95 
Total 118 33 22 74 45 292 
Source: Calculated from data provided by the WTO 
 
Table 2: EU Antidumping petitions between 1990 and 2002 against selected target countries 
(Number of cases filed per quarter) 
Target countries  
United 
States  
Korea Canada China Japan Five target 
countries 
Average 0.21 0.61 0.02 1.29 0.42 0.51 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 1 3 1 5 3 5 
Standard 
deviation 
0.41 0.87 0.14 1.17 0.72 0.87 
Total 11 32 1 67 22 133 
Source: Calculated from data provided by the WTO 
 
VARIABLES IN THE MODELS 
 
In this study, we choose to focus on three factors among the various 
macroeconomic phenomena which are liable to influence the triggering of 
antidumping actions: changes in the exchange rate, fluctuations in the level of 
economic activity; and the rate of import penetration. Monthly data on all of 
the variables are aggregated to quarters for our analysis because of the large 
number of months without new petitions5. 
The impact of these three determinants on antidumping filings is 
estimated with the OLISNET database of the OECD. The influence of each of 
these three variables is analysed both in the very short run (one year) and in 
the short/medium run (three years), except for the exchange rate whose 
fluctuations are considered only over a one-year period. 
 
General economic activity and industrial production 
 
                                                 
5 The results of our estimations using monthly data can be obtained upon request. 
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The influence of the business cycle is evaluated with variations in real 
GDP or the index of the industrial production. More precisely, we use the 
average growth rate of GDP, as well as of the industrial production index, 
either over the previous year (specification #1) or over a 3-year period before 
the filing date (specification #2).  
The average growth of real GDP of the filing country is denoted 
RGDP(-1) for specification #1 and RGDP(-3) for specification #2. Similarly, 
the average growth rates of industrial production are denoted INDPROD(-1) 
and INDPROD(-3). 
Economic theory, as well as common sense, suggests that “bad” 
economic situations reinforce the demand for protection, thus contributing to a 
resurgence of protectionism, while “boom” periods are likely to further trade 
liberalization. Nevertheless, the causality relationship is not quite so simple, 
because trade policy also influences the economic situation. Protection tends 
to curb economic activity, while trade liberalization stimulates economic 
growth. Whatever the causal relationship might be, we can expect that filings 
are negatively related to the business cycle. A glance at the data confirms this 
relationship. For example, in 1992, an economic slump year, the number of 
antidumping procedures significantly increased6. 
 
The force of international competition 
 
The intensity of foreign competition suffered by country i is measured 
by the rate of import penetration (denoted iRIMP ): 
i
j
ij
i DD
M
RIMP
∑
=  
Where ijM  the imports of product j  by country i  (respectively the US and the 
EU) and ij
j
M∑  its total imports.  
For the purposes of this article, we consider the EU, like the US, as one 
single commercial entity, which means that we take into account only imports 
from extra-EU countries7. 
 
iDD is the domestic demand in country i  
iiuiri INVCPCPDD ++=  
Where: 
ir CP is the private consumption in country i  
                                                 
6 In 1992, the total number of filings in the world was equal to 326 while this number is 
usually around 200 per year.  
7 Since the antidumping procedures initiated by the EU are targeted at trading partners outside 
the Union, it makes sense to consider only the intensification of extra-EU competitive 
pressure. 
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iuCP is the public consumption in country i  
iINV is the investment in country i  
 
Logically, an increase in the rate of import penetration should lead to 
greater demands for protection in the importing country. Consequently, filings 
should be positively related to the import penetration rate.  
In our estimations, as for the GDP, we consider both one-year and the 
three-year average import penetration rates prior to the opening of the 
antidumping procedure. The rate of import penetration during the previous 
year is denoted RIMP (-1) while the average rate over the three-year prior to 
the filing date is denoted RIMP (-3). 
 
The foreign exchange rate 
 
The real exchange rate is the last of the three major macroeconomic 
determinants that we take into consideration. Actually, the influence of 
exchange rate changes on antidumping filings is not quite obvious. For 
example, when the US dollar is appreciating, the foreign exporters may have 
some incentives to increase the price of shipments (denominated in their home 
currency), so as to reduce the risk to be accused of selling at “less than fair 
value”. In such a case, the appreciation of the US dollar should logically 
reduce the opportunities of antidumping initiations by American firms. 
However, if this price adjustment does not completely offset the total impact 
of the US dollar appreciation, as echoed by most empirical studies8, the dollar 
price of the US import will fall, which may cause damages to the US industry. 
Consequently, a strong dollar may increase as well the number of US 
antidumping initiations, as it makes easier to prove a material injury. Which of 
these two effects is the most important?  
Without prejudging in any way the degree of pass through, we test the 
relation between the number of quarterly filings and the real exchange rate. To 
this end, bilateral real exchange rates of the US dollar and the euro vis-à-vis 
each of the target countries’ (listed in Tables 1 and 2) currencies are calculated 
on the basis of consumer prices. The real exchange rate series are normalized 
by dividing each rate series by its mean so as to offset the scale effect from 
one exchange rate to the other. We lag the real exchange rate by one year, 
because the national authorities (both in the US and in the EU) examine 
pricing issues over a one-year period prior to the opening of investigations9. 
The one-year lagged real exchange rate is denoted RER(-1). 
 
                                                 
8 See for example P. Goldberg and M. Knetter (1997) or J.M. Campa and L. Goldberg (2004) 
9 See Knetter and Prusa (2003) and Feinberg (2003). 
6 Global Economy Journal Vol. 6 [2006], No. 3, Article 5
http://www.bepress.com/gej/vol6/iss3/5
  
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
 
OVER-DISPERSION TEST 
 
The number of antidumping procedures is typical of count data. It is a 
discrete variable. We can model the probability of occurrence of any number 
of antidumping filing either with a Poisson or with a negative binomial 
regression. We have used the test of over-dispersion suggested by Cameron 
and Trivedi (1990) in order to choose which regression model should be 
adopted. 
The over-dispersion tests are carried out on the average growth rate of 
real GDP over the three-year period prior to the filing, as well as on the 
industrial production index over the same period. The results of the test show 
that the overdispersion parameter is always highly significant. Therefore, there 
is an over-dispersion of the number of antidumping filings in these two 
countries. This result leads us to choose a negative binomial model. 
Furthermore, α, the over-dispersion parameter is also positive and significant 
in the various estimations based on the negative binomial model. The data are 
thus consistent with this model. 
 
WHY TWO SPECIFICATIONS?  
 
The WTO antidumping committee does not provide accurate 
indications about the time period which has to be taken into account in the 
investigations aimed at analyzing whether or not dumping is taking place and 
whether dumped imports are causing material injury. The 1994 GATT 
agreement states that the period taken into consideration in the investigation of 
the existence of dumping ‘is normally one year, but should not in any case be 
less than 6 months’. The recommendation of the WTO antidumping 
committee is representative of the absence of guidelines: according to this 
committee, the investigations meant for assessing the damages should 
normally cover at least three years, but they also can cover a shorter period.10 
This means that national authorities are completely free to adapt these periods 
to each specific case. The consequence is a large disparity of practices and 
legal frameworks from one country to another11. 
In the US, the Department of Commerce (DOC) is in charge of 
determining dumping while the International Trade Commission (ITC) is in 
charge of injury determination. These two government agencies investigate 
over a three-year period prior to the filing of the case. In the EU, the European 
Commission assesses both price behaviour and material injury. The usual 
                                                 
10 WTO recommendation May 5, 2000. 
11 However, the dominant practices of the national authorities – consistent with the 
recommendations of the WTO antidumping committee – adopt a short period (typically one 
year) in the pricing behaviours investigations and a longer period (typically 3 years) in the 
material injury investigations. 
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procedure is to investigate whether or not dumping is taking place over a 6 to 
12-month period (in most cases). After that, injury investigations are carried 
out by the Commission over a three-year period12. However, in some cases, 
the time period applied to injury determination can be reduced to only one 
year13. 
Of course, the choice of one year instead of three years in injury 
assessment influences the identification of the determinants of antidumping 
filings. The choice of time period is an important specification issue. 
Assuredly, any choice is, to some extent, arbitrary. However, our 2 
specifications (respectively based on a one-year period and a three period) 
give a plausible approximation of the actual procedures of the reporting 
countries. In addition, this choice may be useful to differentiate the practices 
of the US and the EU. Lastly, it is also justified by the fact that Knetter and 
Prusa (2003) and Feinberg (2005) consider a one-year lag for the foreign 
exchange rate and a three-year period for the GDP, which will facilitate the 
comparison between their results and ours. 
Due to the correlations among the growth rate of the GDP, the rate of 
import penetration and the index of industrial production, we develop three 
estimation models in which each of these variables is considered separately. 
These models are applied, for each specification (one or three years), both to 
the US and the EU, resulting in a total of 5 models to be estimated for each 
country. 
In specification #1, we consider the real GDP growth rate, the average 
rate of import penetration and the industrial production index during the year 
prior to the antidumping filing (see columns i, ii, and iii in tables 3 and 4). In 
specification #2, we refer to these same variables over a three-year period 
prior to the filing (see columns iv, v and vi in these same tables). The real 
exchange rate is present in all the specifications. 
After estimating the influence of each variable on the number of 
filings, we try to estimate eventual trend effects: does this influence change 
over time and if so in which direction? To this end, we identify a variable, 
TIME, defined as the date of the filing, expressed in number of quarters since 
the beginning of the period chosen (that is: since the beginning of 1990). So, 
the TIME value associated with the first quarter of 1990 is equal to 1, the 
second quarter has a TIME value equal to 2, and so on up to 52 for the last 
quarter of 2002. We capture a possible interaction between each determinant 
variable and TIME by multiplying each variable by the log of TIME (Log-
TIME). In order to simplify the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, we 
combine Log-TIME with the log of each determinant variable, except for the 
GDP real growth rate (which can be a negative value). 
 
                                                 
12 In accordance with the WTO antidumping code, a causality relation must be established 
between dumping and injury to community industry. 
13 See the WTO recommendation, G/ADP/6, May 16, 2000. 
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RESULTS 
 
To facilitate the comparison of our results with those of Knetter and 
Prusa (2003) and Feinberg (2005), we present in Tables 3 and 4 the incidence 
rate ratios (IRR) associated with the estimated coefficients. The Poisson 
regression model assumes that the incidence rate (i.e. the rate per unit at which 
a happening occurs) is a function of some underlying variables as follows: 
 
0 1 1 2 2 ...j j k kjx x xIr eβ β β β+ + + +=  
 
The expected number of occurrences is equal to this incidence rate 
multiplied by the exposure (the number of units of time over which 
observations are measured). The exposure is uninteresting in our case since 
each observation in the data set is the number of antidumping filings in a one-
year and three-year interval. 
The IRR is a function of some underlying variables. IRR represents the 
ratio of the counts predicted by the model when the variable of interest is one 
unit above its mean value and all other variables are at their means to the 
count predicted when all variables are at their means. Thus, if the IRR for the 
real exchange rate is 1.50, then a one-unit increase in the real exchange rate (a 
100% real appreciation given that we use the log of the real rate) would 
increase counts by 50% when all other variables are at their means. (Knetter 
and Prusa, 2003). The t-statistics are reported for a test of the null hypothesis 
that the IRR=1, which would imply no relationship between the dependant 
variable and the regressor. 
For the US, the estimations are completed by estimations with 
temporal effect, which take into account the interactions of three variables 
TXGDP, LogRIMP and LogINDEXPROD with LogTIME for each 
specification. We use TIME variable to control the learning’s effects. The log 
specification for the TIME variable (LogTIME) is connected to the decreasing 
marginal learning effects.  For the EU, we only presented the specifications 
without temporal effects because variables with temporal effects yield no 
significative coefficients. Indeed, there are few openings antidumping 
procedures (compared with the US). The expected learning effects do not exist 
in fact in EU. 
 
US Results 
 
Specification #1 
 
The IRR estimated for the exchange rate delayed one year LogRER (-
1) is 1.03 in columns (i), ii) and iii) of the table 3. That means a real 
appreciation of 100% of the exchange rate would increase the openings of AD 
procedures to 3%. The integration of the temporal effect shows that a real 
appreciation of 100% of the exchange rate delayed one year would reduce the 
9Sadni Jallab et al.: Antidumping Procedures and Macroeconomic Factors in US and EU
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number of AD procedures from 12% to 13.5% (the IRR is included between 
0.88 and 0.86). 
 
The average rates of GDP growth, import penetration and the index of 
industrial production are not significant. Their effects are thus considered as 
null, the IRR is fixed to 1. When we take into account the temporal effect, the 
IRR of LogTIME*RGDP (-1) is 0.78, implying that a 22% reduction in the 
number of openings of procedures is associated to a one percentage point 
increase in the GDP growth rate. The IRR of LogTIME*TPIMP (-1) is 0.31. 
An increase of 100% of the import penetration rate of the US would increase 
the number of openings of antidumping procedures to 69% in the time period 
considered.  
On the whole, our results show that short variations in the level of 
general economic activity or in the level of industrial activity or in imports 
have no significant impact on the number of openings of antidumping 
procedures. Next we consider the results for longer periods. 
 
Specification #2 
 
Columns (iv), (v) and (vi) in Table 3 show that an appreciation of 
100% in the lagged real exchange rate would increase openings of 
antidumping procedures by 25%. An appreciation of 100% in the lagged real 
exchange rate with temporal effect LogTIME*LogRER (-1) would reduce the 
number of procedures by 27% (IRR equal to 0.73). The directions of evolution 
of variables are coherent with those obtained by Feinberg (2005). It means that 
the positive relation between the real exchange rate and the opening of 
antidumping inquiry is a short-term relation. Over a long period, the 
appreciation of the exchange rate would even tend to lower the number of AD 
procedures. 
The IRR of the average GDP growth rate RGDP(-3) is 0.09. A decline 
of a unity of the growth rate would thus increase the number of openings of 
antidumping procedures to 91% in the US. This result confirms our 
expectations and is in accordance with the results of the previous studies: the 
slowing down and, to an even greater extent, the decline of the economic 
activity increases the openings of antidumping actions. In the phases of 
expansion, we note fewer antidumping procedures. However, if we take into 
account the temporal effect, the relation between the GDP and the number of 
antidumping filings turns out to be positive: a one percentage point increase in 
the GDP growth rate over the entire period would increase the number of 
filings by 24.6%. 
It is different when we take into account the index of industrial 
production. Indeed, the IRR of LogINDEXPROD (-3) is not significant. On 
the other hand, the IRR of LogTIME*LogINDEXPROD (-3) is 1.02. In the 
long run, an increase of the index of industrial production would thus 
10 Global Economy Journal Vol. 6 [2006], No. 3, Article 5
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engender an increase of 2% in the number of antidumping procedures in the 
US.  
 
Import penetration rate has an IRR, which is equal to 1.6015. An 
increase of 100% of the import penetration rate would lead to an increase of 
61.5% of the number of procedures. This effect disappears in the long run 
(coefficient not significant for LogTIME*LogTPIMP (-3)). This means that in 
the long run, the intensity of the foreign competition does not produce a 
significant effect on the initiations of antidumping actions. The influence of 
the competition is essentially cyclic. 
 
EU Results 
Specification #1 
 
Columns (i) and (ii) in Table 4 show that the IRR of the real exchange 
rate lagged one year is 1.02. So, an appreciation of 100% of the real exchange 
rate would increase the number of the antidumping procedures to 2%.  
The average rate of GDP growth during the year previous to the 
opening of the antidumping procedure is not significant. Short-term variations 
in general economic activity, thus do not seem to affect the openings of 
antidumping inquiries in Europe. This result is confirmed by the non-
significativity of the import penetration rate variable. This conclusion is quali- 
fied by the effect of the index of industrial production. Indeed, an increase of 
100% of LogINDEXPROD (-1) would decrease the number of opening 
procedures by 14% (because the IRR of the index of the industrial production 
is 0.856) in Europe. All in all, only short-term variations in specific industrial 
sectors have a significant influence. 
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Table 3: IRR in the United States 
 
Specification#1 
 
Specification#2 
 
Variables 
 (i) (ii) (iii)  (iv) (v)  (vi) 
LogRER(-1) 
 
LogTIME* LogRER(-1) 
 
RGDP(-1) 
 
LogTIME* RGDP(-1) 
 
LogRIMP(-1) 
 
LogTIME* LogRIMP(-1) 
 
LogINDPROD(-1) 
 
LogTIME*LogINDPROD(-1) 
 
RGDP(-3) 
 
LogTIME* RGDP(-3) 
 
LogRIMP(-3) 
 
LogTIME* LogRIMP(-3) 
 
LogINDPROD(-3) 
 
LogTIME*LogINDPROD(-3) 
1.0303 
(2.749) 
0.8770 
(-2.945) 
1.00 
(0.268) 
0.7815 
(-2.417) 
 
1.0296 
(2.486) 
0.8763 
(-2.737) 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
(0.858) 
0.3117 
(1.649) 
1.0302 
(2.512) 
0.8741 
(-2.747) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
(1.522) 
0.9968 
(-1.8822) 
1.2458 
(2.921) 
0.7354 
(-3.388) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0891 
(-2.298) 
1.2465 
(2.108) 
1.2511 
(3.107) 
0.7308 
(-3.566) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6015 
(1.981) 
1.00 
(1.052) 
1.2544 
(3.156) 
0.7311 
(-3.577) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
(-0.844) 
1.0179 
(1.667) 
Log likelihood unrestricted 
Likelihood ratio test 
Number of observations 
-316.324 
96.4656 
220 
-318.566 
101.4925 
220 
-317.981 
100.7409 
220 
-236.217 
18.1267 
180 
-236.63 
21.0202 
180 
-245.799 
36.2856 
180 
Estimated are reported as “incidence rate ratios”. t-statistics (in brackets) reported for a test of 
no effect on antidumping actions (which corresponds to an IRR value of 1.0). The likelihood 
ratio test points out that all the slope coefficients in the binomial negative are zero. For this 
test, the constant term remains unrestricted 
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Specification #2 
 
The real exchange rate always appears as a significant determinant of 
antidumping actions. According to our estimation, an appreciation of 100% in 
the real exchange rate would lead to an increase in the number of the 
antidumping procedures from 13% to 24% (The IRR varies between 1.13 and 
1.24). 
 
Table 4: IRR in Europe 
 
Specification #1:  
 
Specification #2 
 
Variables 
(i) (ii) (iii)  (iv) (v)  (vi) 
LogRER(-1) 
 
 
RGDP(-1) 
 
 
LogRIMP(-1) 
 
 
LogINDPROD(-1) 
 
 
RGDP(-3) 
 
 
LogRIMP(-3) 
 
 
LogINDPROD(-3) 
1.0244 
(2.472) 
 
1.00 
(0.676) 
1.018 
(2.570) 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
(0.917) 
1.023 
(2.516) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.856 
(1.965) 
1.1351 
(2.604) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
(-1.228) 
1.119 
(3.830) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
(1.217) 
1.2431 
(3.751) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.7962 
(-2.37) 
Log likelihood unrestricted 
Likelihood ratio test 
Number of observations 
-208.5098 
16.8996 
220 
-209.152 
16.335 
220 
-208.83 
16.8031 
220 
-166.22 
14.3407 
180 
-163.804 
11.794 
180 
-163.61 
11.4934 
180 
Estimated are reported as “incidence rate ratios”. t-statistics (in brackets) reported for a test of 
no effect on antidumping actions (which corresponds to an IRR value of 1.0). The likelihood 
ratio test points out that all the slope coefficients in the binomial negative are zero. For this 
test, the constant term remains unrestricted. 
 
The average rate of growth during the three years, which precede the 
opening of a procedure, has a negative coefficient but is not significant. 
Cyclical variations thus seem to have hardly any influence on the openings of 
inquiries in Europe. This result is in accordance with what actually happens in 
Europe. On the other hand, the IRR of LogINDPROD (3) is 0.796. So, an 
increase of 100% in the index of industrial production would reduce the 
number of anti-dumping procedures to 20%. Therefore, European firms are 
more sensitive to industrial production than to the import penetration rate. 
Indeed, our results show that this variable is not significant even with a 
temporal effect. 
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COMPARISONS OF RESULTS 
 
Comparison of the results between Europe and the United States 
 
The results obtained allow us to differentiate the influences that the 
macroeconomic factors exercise in the US and in the EU respectively. 
 
a) A first difference between the two is the fact that in Europe, temporal 
effects are not significant in the model. A possible explanation of this 
result is that the EU opened relatively few antidumping procedures 
over the period 1990-2002. The total of the openings of procedures vis-
à-vis the five targeted countries taken into consideration is only 133 for 
the EU against 292 for the US.  
 
b) The exchange rate has a significant effect in the US as well as in the 
EU. The IRR in the US is very close to those of the EU. For the US, 
we established the existence of a negative temporal effect of the real 
exchange rate lagged one year on the openings of procedures. This 
means that a preservation of the pattern (a continuous decline of the 
exchange rate) over the whole period would lead to a decrease of the 
number of inquiries. 
 
c) We can also note that the period used to estimate damages has a rather 
significant effect on the probability of an inquiry being opened. Thus, 
in Europe, when a period of one year is used to estimate the damage, 
the level of the IRR of the real exchange rate is around 2% while it is 
around 24% when a three-year period is used. In the US, when a period 
of one-year is used to estimate the damage, we obtain an IRR from the 
real exchange rate of about 3%. The IRR is around 25% when a three-
year period is used. However, when the period of evaluation is of one-
year, the growth rate of the GDP is not significant in either Europe or 
the US. A contrario, when we use a period of three- years to estimate 
the damages, the GDP growth rate has a significant effect with a weak 
IRR in the US. This is not the case in Europe. 
 
Differences in practices and in the antidumping legislation thus appear 
clearly. Indeed, in the US, contrary to Europe, the ITC systematically uses a 
three-year period to determine the possible damage. 
 
d) The effect of intensification of international competition is null on a 
horizon of one- year but very high in the US on a three-year horizon. 
This effect is captured by the import penetration rate variable.  
 
e) Finally, the evolution of industrial production does explain 
antidumping petitions when the period of evaluation of the damages is 
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three years in the US. On the other hand, when we use a lag of one- 
year to estimate damages, the impact of industrial production is 
significant. Surprisingly, in Europe, we obtain an opposite relationship 
between industrial production and antidumping initiations, both over 
one and three years.  
 
Overall, three main conclusions can be drawn from this comparison: 
 
- Variations in the exchange rate are the best common explanation for 
both countries. 
- The index of industrial production is a best "candidate" to characterize 
the EU because it is significant in Europe both over a one or a three-
year period (which is consistent with the actual practice of the 
European Commission).  
- The growth rate of the GDP is the best "candidate" the US. Its impact 
is significant and important only in the US when we use a period of 
three-years to estimate the damages (as is the actual practice of the 
American authorities). 
- The choice of the period for the evaluation of the damages directly 
influences the estimate of the probability of an inquiry being opened. 
 
So the differences noted between the US and Europe seem to be – at 
least partly - explainable by the differences of national regulations and 
practices implemented by the regulatory authorities. 
Comparisons of the results obtained with those of Feinberg (1989, 
2005) and Knetter-Prusa (2003). Table 5 below gives a summary of all the 
obtained results. Prusa and Knetter (2003) found that a real appreciation of 
100% of the dollar would increase the number of procedures by 267% (with a 
ratio of rate of incidence of 3.67), all other variables being at their averages. 
Feinberg (2005) shows that a real appreciation of 100% of the dollar would 
increase the number of procedures by 206% with a ratio of rate of incidence of 
3.06. Our estimates are similar to those of previous studies, but with weaker 
IRR. A possible explanation may be found in the fact that our period of study 
extends over a shorter period (13 years from 1990-2002), while both prior 
studies are for 19 years (1980-1998). Over the longer period, the number of 
observed procedures is greater. Furthermore, the earlier studies use annual 
data on a larger number of countries, whereas we use quarterly data. Finally, 
their estimates are based on negative binomial regressions with random 
effects. 
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Table 5: Estimated coefficients: Comparisons with prior econometric studies 
 US EU 
Macroeconomic factor S1 S2 F or 
KPa 
S1 S2 
Exchange rate without temporal effect +*** +*** +*** +** +*** 
Exchange rate with temporal effect -*** -*** -*** ns ns 
GDP without temporal effect +ns -** -** +ns -ns 
GDP with temporal effect -** +** +** ns ns 
Industrial Production without temporal effect -*** -ns ndb +** -** 
Industrial Production with temporal effect +* + * nd ns ns 
Import penetration rate without temporal 
effect 
+ns +** nd ns ns 
Import penetration rate with temporal effect +* +ns nd ns ns 
***= significant at the 1 % level. **= significant at the 5 % level *= significant at the 10 % level 
a This column compares our results with those obtained by Feinberg (1989, 2005) and by Knetter and 
Prusa (2003). 
b Nd means that these variables were not studied in the previous works. Ns means not significant. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have shown that macroeconomic variables have different effects on the 
numbers of openings of antidumping procedures in the US and in Europe. 
First, an appreciation of the real exchange rate has a positive impact on 
openings of procedures in the US and within the EU. However, the dimension 
of the effect is greater in the US and the temporal effect of the exchange rate is 
present only in the US. Next, the economic cycle (measured by GDP changes) 
has an impact on openings of procedures only in the US. The intensification of 
foreign competition (measured by the import penetration rate) also increases 
openings of procedures in the US. Openings are also influenced by the very 
short-term and\or medium-term level of general American economic activity, 
whereas they depend more specifically on the economic situation of the 
industry in Europe. These results show the influence of institutional 
differences, notably in the rules, which govern the antidumping procedures on 
both sides of the Atlantic. The difference concerning the reference periods in 
the calculation of damages is perceptible in our results (a shorter period in the 
case of the EU of the order of 15 months against three years in the US). It also 
seems that the European procedure is less effective – or, at least, offers a lesser 
degree of protection - than the American procedure when we consider the 
impact of the economic cycle, the influence of exchange rates and competitive 
pressures. Paradoxically, however, the European procedure seems more 
selective, perhaps more targeted, than the American procedure (we noted no 
significant relationship with the GDP in Europe, but a relationship with 
industrial production was found in Europe whereas the opposite was found for 
the US). Future research should go beyond the simple explanation of openings 
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of antidumping procedures undertaken in this study to take into account the 
impact of world competition. For example, only cases of dumping which lead 
to a threat of monopolization of the market must now be sanctioned in the 
form of temporary or definitive antidumping rights. These two factors, world 
competition and the WTO definition of dumping may be found to have major 
responsibility for the current intensification of the use of non-tariff barriers, in 
particular institutional barriers to trade. 
This ‘crawling neo-protectionism’ could eventually ruin the efforts of 
half a century to liberalize international trade and build a multilateral trading 
system. The EU and the US should accept the responsibility for engaging in a 
“disarmament” process regarding these procedures by proposing an 
amendment to the Antidumping Agreement, which would limit the 
discretionary power of the national authorities. It would also be advisable to 
increase transparency in the determination of damage, in the normal 
calculation of the value of damage, and in the determination of the dumping 
margin. 
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